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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the District Court abused its discretion by entering judgment for PacifiCorp, 
dba Utah Power ("Utah Power"), in accordance with the evidence in support of the Order 
of Immediate Occupancy due to Defendants' repeated failures to comply with the Court's 
scheduling orders. This Court reviews this decision of the district court for abuse of 
discretion. See Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The issues presented by this appeal are governed by Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d), and Utah 
R. Civ. P. 37(b). These rules are set out, in relevant part, in the argument section below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The Complaint in this case was filed by Utah Power in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court for Wasatch County, State of Utah, on July 17, 1998, seeking the 
condemnation of transmission line easements and a substation site. (Rl-25). 
2. On September 10, 1998, Utah Power filed its Motion for an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and further 
supported by the appraisal affidavit of Bryce A. Clinger. (R39-71). 
3. Following an October 30, 1998 hearing before Judge Guy R. Burningham in 
Heber City, and over the objections of Defendants raising the same development issues now 
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raised, Judge Burningham entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and granted on 
Order of Immediate Occupancy. (Rl 57-160). 
4. On or about November 5,1998, Utah Power deposited into the Court pursuant 
to the Order of Immediate Occupancy the sum of $196,070, equaling 100% of the appraised 
value of the easements and substation site, as per Bryce Clinger. (Rl 70-171). 
5. On or about November 17,1998, Defendants filed in this Court a Petition for 
Writ of Mandamus under Utah R. App. P. 19. (Rl 72-182). On or about December 24, 
1998, this Court denied Defendants' Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (R220). 
6. On March 1, 1999, the parties filed a Joint Request for Initial Pretrial 
Scheduling Conference. (R224, 225). 
7. By telephone conference on April 8, 1999 before Judge Gary D. Stott, a 
schedule was established which included a trial date of August 23,1999 (R227,228). A few 
days later, a Scheduling Order was entered in accordance with Judge Stott's ruling, and 
included a discovery cutoff of June 30, 1999. (R230-231). 
8. On or about July 14, 1999, Defendants filed a Request for Continuance 
seeking a 60-day continuance of all scheduled dates, including the trial date, citing 
"unexpected difficulties . . . in completing an appropriate appraisal." (R232-233). 
9. Also on or about July 14, 1999, the parties, by and through their respective 
counsel of record, entered into a Stipulation to the requested continuance. (R234-235). 
10. On August 12,1999, another telephone scheduling conference was held before 
Judge Gary D. Stott wherein a trial date of November 29, 1999, a discovery cutoff date of 
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November 5, 1999, and a pretrial conference date of November 18, 1999 were established 
by the Court. (R242-244). 
11. A Trial Management Conference Scheduling Order - Non Jury Trial was 
entered by the Court reflecting the aforementioned dates on August 12,1999. (R245-246). 
12. On October 13,1999, Defendants' counsel, E. Craig Smay, filed a Motion for 
Leave to Withdraw stating as grounds therefor that he had lost contact with Defendants and, 
therefore, lacked the ability to direct preparation of this matter. (R247-249). 
13. On October 27, 1999, by way of telephone conference, the Court heard Mr. 
Smay's Motion to Withdraw. The Court granted Mr. Smay's Motion to Withdraw, struck 
the November 29, 1999 trial date, and ordered Utah Power's counsel to file a notice to 
appoint counsel giving defendants 30 days to enter anew appearance of counsel. The Court 
further ordered that if no new counsel appeared within 30 days, a judgment based on Utah 
Power's Order of Immediate Occupancy may be entered. (R250-251). 
14. On October 27, 1999, the ordered Notice to Retain Counsel was sent to 
Defendants' representative in the Netherlands, Arie Bogerd, with a copy to Mr. Smay 
advising Defendants of their responsibility to retain new counsel within thirty days, and that 
failure to do so may result in sanctions, including the entry of a judgment of condemnation. 
(R255-256). 
15. On October 27, 1999, Judge Stott entered an Order in accordance with his 
October 27,1999 rulings. This Order included the following: "The Court will consider the 
entry of a judgment of condemnation based upon the evidence previously submitted in 
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support of plaintiff s motion for an order of immediate occupancy, including the appraisal 
ofMr.Bryce dinger." (R258-259). 
16. On or about November 29, 1999, Mr. Smay sent a letter to Judge Stott, with 
a copy to Utah Power's counsel, advising the Court that Mr. Bogerd had been incarcerated 
for six weeks and that Mr. Bogerd had requested that Mr. Smay resume representation of 
Defendants in this matter. (R262-263). 
17. Following a third telephonic scheduling conference on December 14, 1999, 
Judge Stott entered a Minute Entry - Pretrial Scheduling Order setting a discovery cutoff 
for March 16, 2000 and a final pretrial conference date of April 11, 2000. (R268-269). 
18. On February 25, 2000, Mr. Smay filed with the Court a second Notice of 
Withdrawal of Counsel (R273-275). No reason was given. 
19. A few days prior to the April 11, 2000 Pretrial Conference, Mr. Smay called 
counsel indicating that he intended to re-enter an appearance, but no appearance was filed. 
At the pretrial conference on April 11,2000, and after delaying the hearing for some twenty 
minutes by reason of Mr. Smith's failure to appear, the Court entertained and granted Utah 
Power's request for entry of judgment consistent with the Order of Immediate Occupancy. 
(R276). 
20. On April 24, 2000, Mr. Smay filed a Notice of Appearance of Counsel. 
(R278-279). 
21. On April 24, 2000, Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration (R280-
304). 
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22. On May 17,2000, the Court entered its Ruling denying Defendants' Motion 
for Reconsideration, and indicated that the Court intended to sign the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment of Condemnation proposed by Utah Power. (R346). 
23. On May 17, 2000, the Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment of Condemnation. 
24. On June 9, 2000, Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal (R368-369). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sanction of judgment 
by default against Defendants. Sanctions were warranted under the circumstances, because 
Defendants' dilatory behavior was willful, Defendants' were chiefly to blame for the delay, 
and Defendants', in the face of explicit warnings, engaged in persistent dilatory tactics that 
clearly frustrated the judicial process. The district court selected judgment, including an 
award of just compensation in accordance with credible evidence, as the appropriate 
sanction. This decision was not an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allow a district court to do exactly what the 
district court did in this case—sanction dilatory and uncooperative parties by entering 
judgment against them that included a significant money judgment supported by the 
evidence. The district court's decision was proper, supported by the Rules and case law, and 
was within its wide discretion. 
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In this case, Defendants' repeated failures to meet deadlines imposed by the Court's 
scheduling order violated Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d), which provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, if no 
appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling or pretrial conference, 
if a party or a party's attorney is substantially unprepared to participate in the 
conference, or if a party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, 
the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may make such orders with regard 
thereto as are just, and among others, any of the orders provided in Rule 
37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). 
Rule 37(b)(2), in turn, authorizes courts to impose the following sanctions: (a) an order 
prohibiting a party from introducing certain matters into evidence; (b) an order striking out 
pleadings or parts thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party] 
or (c) an order holding the disobedient party in contempt of court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2). 
In this case, Defendants repeatedly failed to meet deadlines set forth in the district 
court's scheduling orders. The district court determined that this conduct warranted 
sanctions, and, after warning Defendants, selected the sanction of default judgment as 
appropriate under the circumstances. This determination by the district court may not be 
overturned unless it is determined that the district court abused its wide discretion to impose 
sanctions. See Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997). The 
Utah Supreme Court has stated that this wide latitude is required in these situations 
"[bjecause trial courts must deal firsthand with the parties and the discovery process." Id. 
Thus, the sole issue before this Court in this appeal is whether the district court abused its 
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wide discretion by entering judgment by default against Defendants under the circumstances 
presented here. PacifiCorp submits that it did not. 
A. Sanctions Were Warranted Against Defendants 
Review of a district court's decision to impose Rule 37 sanctions is a two-step 
process. The first question to be answered is whether sanctions should have been imposed 
at all. See Morton, 938 P.2d at 274. The Utah Supreme Court has set forth four separate 
reasons for finding that sanctions are warranted: 
[A] party's conduct merits sanctions under Rule 37 if any of the following 
circumstances are found: (1) the party's behavior was willful; (2) the party has 
acted in bad faith; (3) the court can attribute some fault to the party; or (4) the 
party has engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to frustrate the judicial 
process. 
Id. at 276 (emphasis added). If any one of the four circumstances is present, a district court 
is justified in imposing sanctions.1 In this case, at least three of the four circumstances are 
present: Defendants' behavior was willful, Defendants were at fault, and Defendants 
engaged in persistent dilatory tactics that tended to frustrate the judicial process.2 
1
 Defendants argue that "[a] default is not appropriate and will not be sustained, unless 
there is evidence that the failure of compliance was willful or intentional." See Aplt's Br., 
at 15-16. This statement is simply incorrect. Willfulness is merely one of four possible 
reasons for finding sanctions appropriate. See Morton, 938 P.2d at 274,276; see also Hales 
v. Oldrovd, 2000 UT App 75, ^[16,999 P.2d 588; Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, [^16, 
981 P.2d 407; Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1999 UT App 80, f 23, 977 P.2d 508; 
Wright v.Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); W.W. & W.B. Gardner. Inc. v. 
Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734,738 (Utah 1977) (stating that "the sanction of default 
judgment is justified where there has been a frustration of the judicial process"). 
2
 Defendants argue that, in order for the district court's decision to be sustained, the 
district court must "present a clear record on a number of discrete points." See Aplt's Br., 
(continued...) 
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1. Defendants' behavior was willful. 
First, Defendants' behavior was willful. Willfulness is distinct from, and easier to 
show than, bad faith conduct. In order to be considered "willful," Defendants' conduct need 
only be "any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary noncompliance. No 
wrongful intent need be shown." See Tuck. 1999UTApp 127416,981 P.2d407. Under 
the circumstances presented here, Defendants' conduct clearly falls into the "willful" 
category. 
From April 8, 1999 to April 11, 2000, Defendants did nothing to advance this 
litigation, and, specifically, did not produce an appraisal that would contradict the $ 196,070 
appraisal previously submitted by PacifiCorp. In the face of specific warnings both to 
counsel and Defendants' representative, Mr. Bogerd, Defendants continued to utterly 
disregard the Court's efforts to advance the litigation. 
Defendants argue that Mr. Bogerd was incarcerated for a brief period, and that this 
brief incarceration rendered his failure to participate in this litigation involuntary. However, 
2
 (...continued) 
at 19. Again, this statement is simply incorrect, and is based entirely on case law from 
outside the jurisdiction. Under Utah law, the district court need not make specific findings 
(of willfulness, bad faith, etc.) "if a full understanding of the issues on appeal can 
nevertheless be determined by the appellate court." See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989): see also Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 943 
P.2d 260,263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In this case, the district court's findings and record are 
more than adequate, consisting of written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Even if, 
by some stretch, these findings were considered inadequate, this Court has before it all of 
the facts and documents relevant to "a full understanding" of the issues raised herein. See, 
e.g., Aplt's Br. at appendices (attaching voluminous documentation). 
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a disability of days or weeks cannot justify an entire year's nonparticipation. Certainly, 
during the periods when he was out of jail, Mr. Bogerd could have gotten a message to his 
counsel to move for a stay of proceedings given the incarceration. Even during the brief 
incarceration, it strains credulity to imagine that he was completely denied all opportunity 
to speak with friends or counsel. Apparently, however, Mr. Bogerd did not even bother to 
contact his counsel during these periods, whether in or out of prison. 
In support of their incredible proposition that a brief incarceration renders an entire 
year's worth of nonparticipation "involuntary," Defendants submit absolutely no evidence. 
The record does not contain any affidavit or other sworn testimony from Mr. Bogerd or 
others regarding the incarceration or its conditions, or purporting to explain why counsel 
was unable to communicate with Mr. Bogerd for such long stretches. Rather, Defendants 
have produced an array of extra-record unauthenticated hearsay documents, most of which 
are in Dutch, in an attempt to support their argument. Clearly, this is insufficient. 
One case similar to this one on its facts is Larsen v. Collina. 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 
1984).3 In that case, the defendant moved to another part of the state, and did not tell his 
counsel where he was going. As a result, counsel could no longer communicate with the 
defendant. Counsel obtained several extensions of time, but, ultimately, felt it necessary to 
withdraw from representation. Several weeks later, the court entered judgment by default 
3
 Another similar case is Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe. 892 P.2d 4 (Utah 1995), 
in which the Utah Supreme Court upheld a district court's choice of judgment by default as 
an appropriate sanction in a condemnation case. 
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-9-
against the defendant. On appeal, this sanction was upheld, even over the defendant's 
objections that he had not received notice of certain filings and that the sanction was unduly 
harsh. See id. at 54-55. 
In short, Defendants' conduct was not accidental. Defendants knew about the 
deadlines, and had even been explicitly warned by the district court that failure to meet the 
deadlines would result in judgment by default. Despite this, Defendants failed to meet the 
deadlines or even to move for an extension of the deadlines. Rather, Defendants did 
nothing. This type of behavior must be classified as "willful." 
2. Fault must be attributed to Defendants. 
Next, for obvious reasons, most of the fault for this situation must be laid at the feet 
of Defendants themselves, as opposed to their counsel. 
Certainly, counsel attempts to assume responsibility for the situation, based upon his 
failure to appear at the April 11 hearing. See Aplt's Br., at 23. In connection with this mea 
culpa, counsel appears to argue that if the fault for the situation lies with counsel, default is 
inappropriate. See id. at 20 (citing Wayne Cook Enters., Inc. v. Fain Props. Ltd. P'ship, 993 
P.2d 1110 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999)). While out-of-state sources may provide some support for 
this position, this is an incorrect statement of the law in Utah. Utah courts have cited 
favorably to M.E.N. Co. v. Control Fluidics. Inc.. 834 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1987), see 
Schettler. 768 P.2d at 961-62, and Defendants cite the M.E.N, case favorably in their brief, 
see Aplt's Br. at 16. The Court in M.E.N, stated plainly enough that "[attorney 
incompetence may be a sufficient basis for default judgment" and that, in such cases, 
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"[r]edress for such incompetence is usually found in a suit for malpractice." See M.E.N., 
834 F.2d at 873. This comports with the language of Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d), which provides 
for sanctions when the party or the party's attorney fails to comply. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
16(d). 
In any event, the lion's share of the blame for the district court's ruling must fairly 
be laid at the feet of Defendants themselves. All counsel did was appear belatedly at one 
hearing. Defendants' themselves, on the other hand, altogether ceased participation in this 
litigation over a one-year period. Defendants ceased returning counsel's phone calls and 
other attempts at communication. Defendants made no effort to contact their counsel, even 
though they knew (because the district court had warned them) that the discovery schedule 
and deadlines were to be taken very seriously in this case. Defendants' conduct caused 
counsel to withdraw from representation not once, but twice. In short, Defendants appear 
to have made a conscious decision not to participate in this litigation. They should be 
required to live with the forewarned consequences of that decision. 
3. Defendants have engaged in persistent dilatory tactics tending to 
frustrate the judicial process. 
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that Defendants' behavior was not willful and that 
Defendants were not at least partially at fault for the situation, sanctions were nevertheless 
warranted because Defendants have engaged in persistent dilatory tactics that have frustrated 
PacifiCorp, the district court, and the judicial process. On April 8, 1999, the district court 
entered a Scheduling Order setting this matter for trial in August 1999. Upon the stipulation 
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of both parties, the trial date was later bumped to November 1999. Just weeks before the 
November trial date, Defendants' counsel withdrew, claiming that he could no longer 
communicate with Defendants. At a telephonic hearing regarding the withdrawal, the 
district court warned Defendants' counsel that if no new counsel appeared during the 30-day 
period, and if Defendants kept up their dilatory tactics, the district court would enter 
judgment by default against Defendants. 
A month later, counsel re-entered his appearance, and a new trial date was set for the 
late spring of 2000. However, in February 2000, counsel withdrew again, claiming for a 
second time that he was unable to communicate with his client. Finally, on April 11,2000, 
counsel (who had not yet formally re-re-entered his appearance) failed to timely appear at 
a hearing. Understandably, the district court had seen enough, and entered judgment by 
default against Defendants. 
Under these circumstances, there can be no question that Defendants have engaged 
in repeated and consistent dilatory tactics that have tended to frustrate the judicial process. 
In short, then, there are at least three separate and independent reasons why the 
district court was justified in imposing sanctions against Defendants: the conduct was 
willful, Defendants must shoulder the lion's share of the fault for the situation, and 
Defendants have exhibited continuing dilatory tactics that have frustrated the judicial 
process. The district court's decision that sanctions should be imposed was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
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B. Entry of Judgment By Default Was an Appropriate Sanction 
The second question to be answered is whether the district court abused its discretion 
in its choice of the particular sanction to impose under the circumstances. Utah courts have 
been clear that district courts have wide latitude in their selection and imposition of a 
particular sanction, and that "the choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is primarily the 
responsibility of the trial judge." See Hales. 2000 UT App 75, [^16, 999 P.2d 588. The 
district court's decision regarding which sanction to apply is reviewed only for abuse of 
discretion. Id. Appellate courts will find an abuse of discretion in a trial court's selection 
of a sanction "only when there is either an erroneous conclusion of law or no evidentiary 
basis for the trial court's ruling." See id. 
In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in selecting entry of 
judgment by default as the appropriate sanction.4 The district court made no erroneous 
conclusion of law. And the district court's ruling was grounded in a sound evidentiary basis. 
1. The district court made no erroneous conclusion of law. 
The district court made no erroneous conclusion of law. Rule 37(b)(2) specifically 
authorizes district courts to enter "an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, . . . or 
rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party." See Utah R. Civ. P. 
37(b)(2)(C). Although Defendant does not appear to argue explicitly that the district court 
4
 It should be noted that Defendants' "default" arguably cost them nothing. The 
$196,070 on deposit with the Court, at least in the expert opinion of Mr. dinger, is "just 
compensation" for the condemned properties. 
524509v1 
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made an erroneous conclusion of law in its choice of sanction, there are portions of 
Defendants' brief that could possibly be construed as arguments against the district court's 
application of the law. PacifiCorp will attempt to respond to these portions of Defendants' 
brief. 
First, Defendants argue that "default is not appropriate and will not be sustained, 
unless there is evidence that the failure of compliance was willful or intentional." See Aplt's 
Br., at 15-16. Again, as discussed above, there is certainly evidence that Defendants' 
conduct was willful, as that term has been defined by Utah courts. See supra Part I.A.I. 
Even if there were not such evidence, however, Defendants' statement of the law is 
incorrect. Willfulness is one of four grounds for imposing sanctions. See supra Part LA & 
note 1. And in any event, willfulness is a factor in the first step of the analysis (whether 
sanctions are warranted at all) and not in the second (whether the district court's choice of 
sanction is appropriate). 
Second, Defendants argue that, in order to "sustain a discretionary default," the 
district court must "present a clear record on a number of discrete points." See Aplt's Br., 
at 19. Again, as discussed above, the district court's record is sufficient. See supra note 2. 
And, even if it were for some reason considered insufficient, that would still not be grounds 
for reversal as long as this Court has before it enough documentation to arrive at "a full 
understanding of the issues." See Schettler, 768 P.2d at 962. There can be no question that, 
at a minimum, this Court has before it all of the relevant facts in order to arrive at a full 
understanding of the situation. 
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Not only are Defendants incorrect when they argue that the district court was required 
to make findings, Defendants are also incorrect when they argue that the district court was 
required to specifically find (a) that PacifiCorp was prejudiced; (b) that any fault lies with 
Defendants rather than with Defendants' counsel; and (c) that other potential remedies have 
been examined and that no lesser remedy would suffice. See Aplt's Br., at 20. Defendants' 
support for these propositions comes from out-of-state case law; no Utah case stands for 
these propositions.5 Under Utah law, as set forth in Morton and its progeny, these 
considerations need not be taken into account.6 
Thus, any argument that Defendant might make regarding the district court's legal 
conclusions is without merit. The district court correctly applied the law in making the 
5
 The only Utah case cited by Defendants on this point is Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 
396 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1964). This case simply does not support the weight laid upon it 
by Defendants. That case states that "[ejxcept in very aggravated cases, less serious 
sanctions undoubtedly could be applied to accomplish the desired result." Id. at 412. Later 
in that same paragraph, however, the court stated that the choice of sanction "is primarily 
for the district court to determine." Id. Nowhere in the Tucker Realty decision is there any 
hint of a requirement that a district court must consider lesser alternative sanctions. In any 
event, to the extent Tucker Realty is inconsistent with Morton and the more modern 
pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court, it is superseded by those cases and their 
clearly-established two-step analysis. 
6
 Moreover, even if Utah law did require that these factors be taken into account, the 
district court would still be in compliance with Utah law. The district court explicitly found 
that Defendants' actions "resulted in substantial prejudice to Plaintiff," see Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, at j^ 1, and the district court, at least implicitly, determined that 
default was the appropriate sanction. It is worthy of note, again, that the district court 
warned Defendants that judgment would be entered against them if they persisted in their 
dilatory ways. And, finally, the district court found that "defendants' [not defendants' 
counsel] continuing failure to comply with the Court's scheduling orders" was a maj or factor 
in the decision to impose sanctions. See id. at ^ 3 (emphasis added). 
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determination that judgment by default was the most appropriate sanction under the 
circumstances. 
2. The district court's ruling was grounded in a sound evidentiary 
basis. 
Finally, the district court's ruling was grounded in a sound evidentiary basis. The 
district court entered written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law setting forth the 
reasons for its decision to impose the sanction of default. Defendant appears to take issue 
with only one paragraph in the entire Findings and Conclusions: Paragraph 13, regarding 
prejudice to PacifiCorp. See Aplt's Br. at 22. 
With regard to that Paragraph, Defendants argue that it was inappropriate for the 
district court to make a finding based upon "representation of counsel." See Aplt's Br. at 
22. This argument fails for two independent reasons. First, and as discussed above, there 
is no requirement under Utah law that prejudice to the non-dilatory party even be taken into 
account; all of Defendants' support for this proposition comes from out-of-state case law. 
See supra Part I.B. 1. Thus, even if Defendants' argument were correct, and the district court 
really were in error in making such a finding, this would not be grounds for reversal. 
Second, in connection with the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Defendants, 
PacifiCorp submitted an affidavit from R. Jeffrey Richards of PacifiCorp. In the affidavit, 
Mr. Richards explained the situation then extant regarding the governmental permitting 
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process, and provided ample evidentiary support, apart from representations of counsel, for 
Paragraph 13.7 
In short, the district court's decision was fully grounded in a sound evidentiary basis. 
The district court's selection of judgment by default as the appropriate sanction was entirely 
appropriate under the circumstances; Defendants have not carried their burden of showing 
that this decision was an abuse of the wide latitude granted to district courts to impose 
sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court to enter judgment by 
default against Defendants was within that court's wide discretion. The district court's 
decision should be affirmed. 
DATED t h i s / l / d a y of February, 2002. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Anthony L. K^jnpton 
Ryan M. Hams 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
7
 In addition, Defendants' arguments regarding this Paragraph—that findings based on 
representation of counsel are improper—are interesting in light of Defendants' arguments 
in their brief before this Court, based entirely on representations of counsel and unsworn 
hearsay documents in a foreign language, that their failure to comply with the district court's 
scheduling orders was justified. 
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